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Introduction*
     The epistemological writings of W.V.O.Quine may, to some extent, be seen as a 
response to the on-going dialectic between empiricism and realism.  The problem with 
Quine is that depending on which of his works one reads he appears to be (a) An 
empiricist realist arguing that what is needed to bridge the gap between appearance and 
reality has been grossly overestimated - the Quine of such articles as "The Scope and 
Language of Science" and "Posits and Reality," (b) A phenomenalistic idealist who treats 
physical objects as mere conveniences for predicting experience - the Quine of certain 
sections of "On What There is" and "Two dogmas of Empiricism," (c) An anti-realist 
who debunks the notion of absolute ontology -the Quine of "Ontological Relativity," and 
(d) An anti-epistemologist who claims that normative theories of justification should be 
replaced by causal accounts of the aetiology of our various beliefs - the Quine of 
"Epistemology Naturalized."1
     The fact that Quine seems to embrace so many, often contradictory, positions subverts 
any attempt at a coherent characterization of his epistemological writings.  Indeed it has 
often had the same subversive effect on attempted criticisms of his work.  Thus Sandra 
Harding wryly footnotes in her seminal piece of Quine criticism "Making Sense of 
Observation Sentences,"
     
     I do not scruple to pry the causal elements out from the evaluational ones in his 
[Quine's] work - fully aware, of course, that these incompatible elements 
sometimes occur in  the same paragraph and even in the same sentence.  It is just 
this way he rides two horses at once, I think, which allows him to meet virtually 
any criticism . . . by claiming that the critic had not noticed that elsewhere he, 
Quine,had taken care of the critic's very point. (Harding (1975), pp.67-68, 
emphasis Harding's).
     The chief aim of the following paper is to show that Quine's epistemological writings 
are indeed basically inconsistent.  In particular, Quine's epistemological writings are 
inconsistent about the relationship between causal and epistemological explanation. 
Quine is committed to two incompatible forms of naturalism.  One form of Quinean 
naturalism claims that certain natural relations provide the basis for normative 
epistemological relations.  The other claims that we should abandon the attempt at 
constructing a normative epistemology and merely settle for a causal account of the 
aetiology of belief.  
Roughly speaking, there are three major options for relating causal and epistemological
explanation, epistemological-causal reductionism, epistemological-causal dualism, and 
epistemological eliminativism.  
     Epistemological-causal reductionism is committed to the claim that key epistemic 
concepts, notably the concept of justification, can be reduced to causal concepts.  For 
instance reliabilists such as Goldman and Armstrong claim that schemas such as  'A's 
belief that x is justified' are to be analyzed in terms of such schemas as 'A's belief that x 
was the result of a reliable causal mechanism.'
2     Epistemological-causal dualism is committed to the claim that questions of the 
aetiology of belief are separate from questions of their epistemic, in particular, their 
justificatory, status.  For instance, some advocates of "rational reconstruction", (e.g., the 
Carnap of Der Logishce Aufbau Der Welt) maintain that an individual's belief that there 
is a desk before him is justified because there is a rational reconstruction from sentences 
about sense data to the belief content in question, albeit a reconstruction that may never 
have entered the head of the individual in question.  
 Epistemological eliminativism claims that we should forgo epistemological accounts of 
belief in favor of causal explanations of the aetiology of belief.  On this view beliefs are 
neither justified nor unjustified.  
 Which, if any, of these three positions, reductionist, dualist, or eliminativist, is Quine's?  
Recently, in his essay "Why Reason Can't be Baturalized," Hilary Putnam noted that 
Quine's "Epistemology Naturalized" contains a strong suggestion of epistemological 
eliminativism.  However he reports that in conversation Quine says he does not mean to 
"rule out the normative."  Putnam concludes "So, it's all extremely puzzling." (Putnam 
(1983) p.244). In this paper I will argue for the following solution to this puzzle: Quine is 
a fuzzy eliminativist, that is, one who claims that psychological accounts of the aetiology 
of belief should replace any attempted justificatory account yet at the same time holds 
that such aetiological accounts provide justificatory status to our beliefs. To show this I 
will first briefly examine some of Quine's early epistemological writings.  In these 
writings Quine attempts to provide a positive epistemology.  Then we shall examine 
some of his more recent work where he seems to be taking an eliminativist line.  To avoid 
the charge that Quine has merely shifted position over the years we shall examine some 
of his most recent work which contains both reductionist and eliminativist elements.
1.1  Quine's Early Epistemology
     Those mainly familiar with Quine's early epistemological writings, from his 1948 
essay "On What There Is" to, say, his 1955 essay "Posits and Reality," will perhaps balk 
at the suggestion that Quine is an epistemological eliminativist of either the clear cut or 
fuzzy variety.  Now I believe there are elements of fuzzy epistemological eliminativism 
even in Quine's early works. However I won't try to argue the point here.  Let us briefly 
consider some of the commonly acknowledged major elements of Quine's early 
epistemology.
     First, it is clear that Quine is rejecting certain kinds of epistemological explanation.  In 
particular, he is clearly rejecting those foundationalist epistemological theories which 
attempt to explain how we can have knowledge with certainty of the external physical 
world by deducing physical object statements from supposedly incorrigible statements 
about sense data.  For Quine such certainty is not possible.  Yet, claims Quine, we need 
not see the lack of certainty that accompanies our beliefs about the external world as 
3impugning the right of those beliefs to the title of knowledge.  Rather, we can abandon 
the Cartesian assumption that knowledge requires certainty.2
     Second, in place of the Cartesian foundational approach Quine presents what might be 
called a pragmatic account of justification.  On this account, a belief is justified according 
to its ability to explain, organize, and predict past, present,and future experience.  For 
Quine the fact that a particular posit, say the posit of physical objects, helps explain 
organize and predict past, present and future experience is evidence for the truth of the 
posit in question.  Such evidence does not guarantee the truth of the posit.  Nevertheless it 
makes the posit highly probable, and for justification such high probability, rather than 
certainty, is all that is required.3
     Third, Quine advances a holistic epistemology.  He claims that it is complete theories 
rather than single sentences that face the tribunal of experience.  We will have more to 
say about Quine's epistemological holism in section 1.5 below.4
     I believe that this is a largely correct, though simplified, account of the major elements 
of Quine's early epistemological writings.  Further, I presume that these elements of 
Quine's early epistemological writings are so well known that they do not require further 
elaboration.  What is important for our purposes is to keep in mind the following two 
features of Quine's early epistemology:  First, Quine rejects particular types of 
epistemological explanation, namely those which assume that certainty is a necessary 
condition for knowledge.  Second, while rejecting this kind of epistemological 
explanation, Quine is still in the business of providing genuine epistemological 
explanation.  In particular, he advances a pragmatic account of justification.  Clearly, 
Quine, save that he turns about and explicitly rejects his early epistemological writings, 
cannot be a clear cut epistemological eliminativist.  Thus, if Quine is an epistemological 
eliminativist he is a fuzzy eliminativist.  
1.2  Evidence for the claim that Quine is An Eliminativist
     The evidence that Quine is a fuzzy epistemological eliminativist comes mainly from 
various essays and books he wrote during the 60s and 70s.  Perhaps the most telling 
evidence comes from Quine's 1969 article "Epistemology Naturalized."  In the first few 
pages of "Epistemology Naturalized" Quine compares attempts to reduce statements 
about sense data with attempts to reduce mathematics to "logic proper."  Having 
characterized both these attempts as failed attempts at investing our knowledge of the 
external world and our mathematical knowledge with certainty, Quine concludes: 
     The Cartesian quest for certainty had been the remote motivation for 
epistemology . . . but the quest was seen as a lost cause.  To endow the truths of 
nature with the full authority of immediate experience was as forlorn a hope as 
hoping to endow the truths of mathematics with the potential obviousness of 
4elementary logic. (Quine (1969), p. 74).
This fits in well with the feature of Quine's early epistemology noted above, his rejection 
of the Cartesian quest for certainty.  Now we might expect some remarks representing the 
second feature of Quine's early epistemological writings, namely Quine's claim that we 
can and should settle for a pragmatic account of justification.  This expectation is not 
fulfilled.  Proceeding to reject along with the quest for certainty the quest for a rational 
reconstruction of our knowledge Quine continues:
 But why all this creative reconstruction, all this make believe?  The stimulation 
of his sensory receptors is all the evidence anybody has had to go on, ultimately, 
in arriving at his picture of the world.  Why not just see how this construction 
really proceeds?  Why not settle for psychology! (Quine (1969), p.75)
Certainly and typically Quine's language is not unequivocal here.  For instance, his use of 
the epistemological term 'evidence' suggests that he is still treating seriously the notion of 
justification.  To say that A is evidence for B is to imply that A, to some extent, justifies 
B.  Yet when Quine by use of rhetorical questions suggests that we merely examine how 
individuals come to construct their pictures of the world, that we merely settle for a 
psychological account of such constructions, it seems fairly clear that Quine is here 
suggesting that we settle for a mere causal account of the aetiology of our beliefs, of the 
aetiology of our picture of the world.  
 More generally, the passage suggests that Quine sees only two possibilities:  Either we 
attempt to give a Cartesian foundationalist account of justification or we give up the 
whole quest for a theory of justification and settle for a mere psychological account of 
how we come to believe what we do in fact believe.  The middle ground, the position we 
had previously attributed to Quine, seems to have disappeared.  According to that middle 
position, while there is no need or hope for a successful Cartesian foundationalist account 
of justification, there is still room for a pragmatic account of the justification of belief.  
     The passage quoted above is typical of Quine's fuzzy eliminativism.  He freely uses 
the word 'evidence' to make positive assertions about what is evidence for what, yet at the 
same time he implies that there is no need for any such epistemological assertions.  
     Consider the subsequent passage from "Epistemology Naturalized":
Why not settle for psychology?  Such a surrender of the epistemological burden to 
psychology is a move that was disallowed in earlier times as circular reasoning.  
If the epistemologist’s goal is validation of the grounds of empirical science, he 
defeats his purpose by using psychology or other empirical science in the 
validation.       However, such scruples against circularity have little point once 
we have stopped dreaming of deducing science from observations.  If we are out 
simply to understand the links between observation and science, we are well 
advised to use any available information, including that provided by the very 
5science whose links with observation we are seeking to understand.  (Quine 
(1969), pp. 75-76).
What does Quine mean by the clause "If we are out simply to understand the link
between observation and science?"  Could he possibly be referring to an epistemological 
link?  The answer here must be "No."  Why else would Quine oppose the search for this 
link to the search of those who sought to deduce science from observation?  Clearly it is 
the latter who are searching for an epistemological link.  The link that Quine is here 
referring to is a causal link.  Or is Quine's opposition here not to those who seek an 
epistemological link between observation and science but only to those who seek a 
deductive link between the two?  Perhaps when Quine disparages the old epistemologist's 
goal of validation he is simply disparaging the goal of a deductive validation.  But note 
(i) Quine makes no mention of any possible inductive validation and (ii) Quine's point 
that any use of empirical psychology to validate science would be a form of circular 
reasoning applies as much to inductive validation as deductive validation.  Settling for 
psychology does not help because in doing so we have dropped from a deductive to an 
inductive standard of validation.  It helps because it allows us to simply ignore the whole 
epistemological question of validation.  So here again Quine seems to be acknowledging 
only two possibilities.  Either we try to deductively validate science or we give up the 
whole project of seeking an account of justification.  Quine's picturesque talk of 
surrendering the epistemological burden to psychology is somewhat misleading.  In fact, 
Quine is not proposing that we transfer some burden from one discipline to another.  He 
is really proposing that we totally abandon the epistemological burden and do psychology 
instead. 
     
     Other passages from "Epistemology Naturalized," though typically ambiguous, 
reinforce the claim that Quine is claiming that we should settle for a mere account of the 
aetiology of belief and not attempt any epistemological account of justification.  Thus, 
consider the following passage,
     If all we hope for is a reconstruction that links science to experience in explicit 
ways short of translation, then it would seem more sensible to settle for 
psychology.  Better to discover how science is in fact developed and learned than 
to fabricate a fictitious structure to a similar effect. (Quine (1969), p. 78).
What is missing here is any mention of the normative, evaluative element that is the heart 
of epistemology.  It is one thing to give a reconstruction of the causal processes that lead 
some individual/s to adopt some particular belief/s.  It is quite another thing to appraise 
and explain those processes and beliefs with regard to the question of justification.  After
all, there is presumably a perfectly coherent causal story to be told of how belief in 
witches came to be developed.  Yet this causal story would not count as a justificatory 
explanation.  
     Remarkably, Quine himself seems aware of the gap between causal explanations of 
the aetiology of beliefs and epistemological explanation of the justification of beliefs.  In 
6The Roots of Reference he writes,
 Mostly in this book I have speculated on causes, not justifications . . . . Even in 
the case of bodies, . . . , I   offered no hope of justification.  I entertained no 
thought of translating talk of bodies into talk of sense impressions, . . . I asked 
how, given our stimulations, we might have developed our corporeal style of talk.  
. . .  One could ask, in the same spirit, how we developed our religious talk, our 
talk of witchcraft . . . If we managed to reconstruct these causal chains of 
language learning, we would find that every here and there the learner made a 
little leap on the strength of analogy or conjecture or confusion; but then the same 
seemed to be true of our learning to talk of bodies.  In short, I speculated on      
causes and not on values  (Quine (1973), pp. 136-137. Emphasis mine).
In this passage Quine seems to be rejecting the central claim of epistemological-causal 
reductionism.  He is implicitly rejecting the claim that some causal accounts count as 
justificatory accounts. It is also worth noting here that Quine seems to be acknowledging 
that justification involves values.  Consider this in light of his claim that "Scientific 
theory stands proudly aloof from value judgements" (Quine (1973), p.49) and his well 
known tendency to claim that science provides all the explanation that is needed.  The 
natural outcome is an eliminativist attitude towards justification.  And again we see in 
this passage Quine's tendency to write as if the projects of giving a foundationalist 
account of justification and giving a causal reconstruction of belief are exhaustive.  There 
are legions of anti-foundationalists who, like Quine, despair of translating talk of bodies 
into talk of sensations, yet still hold hopes for a justificatory account of such talk.
     Rather than pressing on with a tiresome, literal analysis of Quine's words, let us 
consider a few passages from some of Quine's other articles of the 70's.  In Quine's 1970 
article "Grades of Theoreticity" we read:
 The dilemma (Quine is here referring to a dilemma about what is the basic unit of 
epistemological explanation) is dissolved and the strain relieved when we give up 
the dream of a first philosophy firmer than science.  If we are seeking only the 
causal mechanism of our knowledge of the external world .(Quine (1970a), p. 2)
The rest of the quotation need not concern us here.  In his 1971 book, The Roots of 
Reference, Quine tells us that:
 Our liberated epistemologist ends up as an empirical psychologist, scientifically 
investigating man's acquisition of science.  (Quine (1973), p. 3).
In Quine's 1975 article "The Nature of Natural Knowledge" we read:
     Epistemology is best looked upon, then, as an enterprise within natural 
science.  Cartesian doubt is not the way to begin.  Retaining our present beliefs 
about nature, we can still ask how we can have arrived at them.  (Guttenplan      
7(1975), p. 68).
Finally I quote from Quine's 1981 article "Things and Their Place in Theories"
 Epistemology, for me, or what comes nearest to it, is the study of how we 
animals can have contrived that very science, given just that sketchy neural input.      
(Quine (1981), p. 21).
Now what by Quine's lights comes nearest to epistemology, by the lights of any genuine 
epistemologist, comes nowhere near it.  We should recall here that Quine is not asserting 
that the whole or certain parts of epistemological explanation are reducible to causal 
explanation in the manner of the epistemological-causal reductionist.  He is claiming that 
causal explanation should replace epistemological explanation and that the traditional 
questions asked by epistemologists should be left unanswered.  Nevertheless Quine's use 
of phrases such as "If we are seeking only the causal mechanism of our knowledge", his 
general loose usage of epistemological terms such as 'evidence' and 'knowledge', suggests 
that he takes his causal explanations as having positive epistemological significance.  
     Quine is a fuzzy eliminativist.  The title of Quine's essay "Epistemology Naturalized" 
is a sign of his fuzzy eliminativism.  As the contents of that article demonstrate, Quine's 
version of epistemology naturalized is the "epistemology" one does when one isn't doing 
epistemology.
1.3  The Motivations Behind Quine's Fuzzy Eliminativism, I:   Switching the 
Explicandum
     Why does Quine on the one hand claim that we should give up the quest for an 
account of justification and simply settle for a psycho-causal account of the aetiology of 
belief and on the other hand suggest that certain causal accounts have important positive 
epistemological implications?  Why is Quine a fuzzy eliminativist?  This is a topic time 
will not allow us to adequately cover here.  However, I will try to outline part of the 
answer to these questions.  
     One advantage of Quine's fuzzy eliminativism is that his tendency to deftly move 
from epistemological to causal explanations, without any attempt to reduce the former to 
the latter, allows him a certain illicit leeway on ontological matters. For instance, Quine, 
often as not, freely uses a phenomenalistic notion of experience as the ultimate 
epistemological explicandum when purely epistemological issues are being canvassed.  
Yet when ontological issues are also at stake, he, often as not, switches to mere causal 
explanation and, in keeping with his physicalist ontology, treats physical sensory 
stimulation, the stimulation of nerve endings and the like, as the ultimate epistemological 
explicandum.  As epistemologist it makes prima facie sense to talk of making posits in 
order to explain, predict, and order one's experience.  It does not make prima facie sense 
8to talk of making posits in order to explain, predict, and order one's stimulations of 
sensory receptors.  Yet qua ontologist with a penchant for physicalism talk of experience 
is highly suspect while talk of sensory stimulation is more grist for the physicalist mill.  
Now stimulation of our sensory receptors may cause us to adopt the posits we do in fact 
adopt.  But it hardly makes sense to say we adopt those posits in order to explain our 
stimulations.  A good many of us do not even have a concept of sensory stimulation let 
alone an avocation for explaining such things.  Quine's solution to this apparent dilemma 
is to wear different hats in different arenas.  When the focus is on strictly epistemological 
concerns he loosely invokes the notion of experience relying on the phenomenalistic 
connotations of that concept to lend plausibility to his speculations.  However when the 
focus is on ontological issues he equates experience with a physical concept, for instance 
stimulation of sensory receptors.
1.4  Motivations, II: Answering the Sceptic
     A paradigm case of Quine's switching from epistemological to causal explanation 
occurs in his various attempts to answer the skeptic.  Here we see a second advantage of 
Quine's fuzzy eliminativism.  It facilitates Quine's presenting causal explanations of, for 
instance, language acquisition, as if they provided genuine answers to traditional 
epistemological problems.  Of course, as is well known, Quine usually refuses to answer 
the skeptic's challenges.  He merely dismisses them out of hand.  Yet the following 
passages from "The Nature of Natural Knowledge' and his book The Roots of Reference
show that Quine will occasionally take on, or, as we shall soon see, pretend to take on, 
the skeptic's challenge:
 I am not accusing the skeptic of begging the question.  He is quite within his 
rights in assuming science in order to refute science . . .  (Quine (1975), p. 68).
Yet it [the new naturalized epistemology] is not a gratuitous change of subject 
matter, but an enlightened persistence rather in the original epistemological 
problem. It is enlightened in recognizing that the skeptical challenge springs from 
science itself, and that in coping with it we are free to use scientific knowledge.   
(Quine (1973), p. 3).
Quine's manner of coping is quite ingenious.  Having, in both the article and book quoted 
from above, apparently accepted the skeptic's challenge Quine then proceeds to ignore it 
and give a mere causal account of how it is that we come to believe what we do in fact 
believe.  Quine, by implicitly suggesting that his various causal explanations have 
epistemological implications, gains the appearance of answering certain traditional 
epistemological questions when in fact he is not making any epistemological assertions at 
all.  It is instructive to note that in The Roots of Reference, after introducing his causal 
accounts of the aetiology of belief as "an enlightened persistence rather in the original 
epistemological problem," Quine writes in the concluding chapter of that book "Mostly in 
this book I have speculated on causes, not justifications!"  As noted above (cf. 1.2 above), 
9the wider context of that quotation  makes clear that Quine is occasionally well aware of 
the gap between straight causal and genuinely epistemological explanation.
     Now despite his occasional acknowledgement of the gap between causal and 
justificatory explanation perhaps we should take more seriously Quine's claim that his 
causal accounts of language acquisition do count as "an enlightened persistence . . . in the 
original epistemological problem."  Indeed Quine often talks of identifying "the evidence 
relation" and "the semantical relation" (Quine (1973), p.38) while offering a causal 
account of the latter.  Thus he claims that
 Any realistic theory of evidence must be inseparable from the psychology of 
stimulus and responses, applied to sentences.(Quine (1960), p.17)
In this vein Quine offers a "genetic strategy" for "investigating the relation of evidential 
support" (Quine (1975), pp.74-5).  According to Quine, in studying the process of 
language acquisition, for instance how a particular child learns through behaviorial 
conditioning to associate a particular range of stimulations with the term 'Fido' or 'dog', 
we see how it is that we come to take certain sensory conditions as evidence for certain 
claims.  In our case of the child, he comes to take certain stimulations as evidence for the 
assertion 'Fido here!' or 'Dog here!' because in learning the language he was conditioned 
to associate such stimulations with the relevant embedded terms.  Now, this may indeed 
account for what typically causes us to regard certain stimulation conditions as evidence 
for certain assertions.  But as long as we remain realists and take the actual presence of, 
say, dogs to be a separate matter from the presence of any stimulation conditions 
(whether described in terms of phenomenal experience or stimulation of sensory 
receptors) we will be open to the sceptical question "Why should we regard those 
stimulation conditions as good evidence for the presence of dogs?"  To give, as Quine 
does, a causal account of how we come to regard x as evidence of y is simply not an 
enlightened persistence in the original sceptical epistemological problem of showing why 
we should regard x as evidence for y, nor is it a method of coping with the sceptical 
challenge.  Indeed the claim that such and such causes us to regard x as evidence for y 
does not assert anything epistemological at all. It does not even entail that x is evidence 
for y.  
     It is worth noting that Quine's vague reductionistic sounding talk of identifying the 
"evidence relation" and "the semantic relation" is quite opposed to the reductionist line 
offered by Armstrong and Goldman.  While Armstrong and Goldman maintain that 
certain assertions are justified because they have a particular causal pedigree (they are the 
result of a reliable causal mechanism) they do not identify this causal pedigree with any 
"evidence relation."  Indeed it is central to their account that an individual can be justified 
in having a certain belief, for instance, there is a noise within earshot, even though there 
is no evidence he has for that belief.  It is just this move that makes their reductionistic 
line effective against many sceptical attacks.  It blocks traditional sceptic regress 
arguments by dissenting from the claim that an individual is only justified in believing a 
claim if he has evidence supporting that claim.5
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     In a recent colloquium address David Stove showed that Popper is a great master of 
the art of presenting non-epistemological assertions as epistemological claims.  It is 
worth reiterating Stove's point here; especially if we keep in mind that both Popper and 
Quine regard themselves as proposing naturalist evolutionary epistemologies.
     When pressed with the question "What justifies a scientist in rejecting a particular 
unrestricted statement of factual probability [e.g. The probability of a human birth being 
male =  .9] Popper will usually answer to the effect that certain observations have been 
made which every respectable member of the scientific community takes as falsifying the 
statementin question.  In fact, the Popperian answer says nothing epistemological at all.  
It does not even attempt to tell us why the scientist is justified.  It merely tells us what 
particular scientists do.  Popper can not (with consistency) make a genuine 
epistemological assertion about what justifies rejection of such a probability statement.  
Such statements are consistent with every observation statement and according to Popper 
we are only justified in rejecting a scientific hypothesis if it is inconsistent with some 
observation.  When faced with a question about what justifies scientists in rejecting a 
given unrestricted statement of factual probability Popper, rather than putting himself up 
for ridicule by making the prima facie absurd claim that scientists have no justification 
for rejecting the statement in question, obfuscates by telling us irrelevant truths about 
what scientists do and do not do.6
     Quine, as we have seen above, obfuscates in a similar fashion, presenting irrelevant 
causal statements as if they had important epistemological consequences.  Ironically, a 
case in point occurs in Quine's discussion of Popper in his article "Empirical Content."  In 
that article, having noted that we cannot conclusively confirm an observation categorical 
such as 'Where there's smoke, there's fire' Quine goes on to say:
This characterization fits Popper's dictum that scientific theories can only be 
refuted, never established. But we do see scope still for intuitive support of 
theories. (Quine (1981), p. 28).
Now if Quine were playing it straight he would proceed by telling us what this support is 
and how it is that such support works.  But instead he merely tells us:
An observation categorical gains our confidence as our observations continue to 
conform to it without exception; this is simple habit forming, or conditioning.  A 
theory formulation, in turn, gains our confidence as the observation categoricals 
implied by it retain our confidence. (ibid.).
Such talk of what does and does not gain and retain our confidence is simply irrelevant to 
the questions of what evidence actually supports our theories and how and why that 
evidence is supportive.  The statement that our confidence in A is gained through B, does 
not even imply that B is evidence for A.
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 In general, naturalists have two coherent options when it comes to the question of 
epistemological concepts.  The first option is to attempt to give clear analyses of 
epistemological concepts in naturalistic terms.  This is the reductionist strategy.  The 
second option is to adopt an eliminativist position and forgo the positive use of 
epistemological concepts.  There is of course a third incoherent option.  This involves a 
refusal to give clear analyses followed by a general muddying of the distinction between 
causal and epistemological claims.  This is the Popper-Quine route.
1.5  Motivations, III: Quine, Holism, and  Observation Statements
Switching from epistemological to causal explanation is essential to Quine's philosophy.  
It is by this maneuver that he is able to present two contradictory accounts of observation 
sentences. In various essays, notably his early essays "On What There Is" and "Two 
Dogmas of Empiricism" Quine presents a holistic epistemology.  As Quine relates, he 
developed this epistemology in reaction to the reductive empiricism of Carnap and other 
positivists.  Carnap in his Der Logische Aufbau Der Welt had attempted to show that 
observation sentences can be reduced to sentences about experience.  In the same vein 
one might attempt to reduce sentences about macroscopic observable objects, for 
instance, the sentence 'There is a brown rectangular table presently before me,' to such 
experiential sentences as 'There is a brown rectangular patch in my visual field.'  This 
project was of vital importance to the positivists since they maintained,first, that any 
statement is meaningful only if it could be completely verified, and second, that any 
(non-analytic) statement could only be completely verified if it dealt wholly with 
experience or was equivalent to a statement (possibly a logical compound of statements) 
dealing wholly with experience.
     Notoriously, Carnap's attempted reduction failed.  Why did it fail?  Let us consider 
Quine's answer.  Take the observation sentence 'There is a brown rectangular table 
presently before me'.  Do my present visual experiences, which happen to include a 
rectangular brown patch in my visual field, serve in themselves to confirm that sentence?  
According to Quine they do not, for if I also, with good reason, believe that the light in 
this room is not a white light, or perhaps that there is a hologram machine in this room 
projecting images of brown tables, then, presuming I am rational, I would not take my 
present visual experiences as confirming the statement 'There is a brown table before me.'  
Thus we have the typical Quinean holistic conclusion that my present visual experience 
does not singly confirm the statement 'There is a table before me' but confirms a wide 
conjunction of statements which together imply (that I am having) the relevant 
experience.  Thus we have the typical Quinean conclusion that in the face of recalcitrant 
experience, for instance, presume there is no brown rectangular patch in my visual field, 
we are, from an epistemological point of view, free to alter our theories in various 
different ways to accommodate the recalcitrant experience.  Thus we have Quine's 
conclusion (from "Two Dogmas"):
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our statements about the external world face the tribunal of experience not 
individually but only as a corporate body. (Quine (1961), p. 41).7
According to this extreme holistic view, our theory of the world is, I quote here from 
Quine's essay "On Mental Events," 
not a society of separately established terms and statements each with its own 
empirical definition. There is no separate meaning in terms of direct experience 
for the statement that there is a table here.  . .  it is the system as a whole that is 
keyed to experience. (Quine, (1976), pp. 221-222). 
Quine's holistic epistemology entails that, contra the positivists' claim, there is no 
epistemologically significant distinction between observation statements and theoretical 
statements - by theoretical statements I mean to include here both statements about 
unobservable microscopic entities and universal generalizations.  Both types of 
statements, where justified, are justified by their being part of a total theory which 
successfully faces "the tribunal of experience."  In "Mental Events" Quine says:
 I expect that tables and sheep are, in the last analysis on much the same footing 
as molecules and elections.  Even these have a continuing right to a place in our 
conceptual scheme only by virtue of their indirect contribution to the overall 
simplicity of our linguistic or conceptual organization of experience . . . (Quine 
(1976), p. 223, emphasis mine).
     In summary then Quine's holistic position entails that observation statements, taken 
singly, do not have their own set of experiential implications.
     Yet this conclusion does not sit well with certain claims made in Quine's Web of 
Belief.  Consider the following claim:
 the observation sentence itself...is peculiar on this core.  It does face the tribunal 
singly, in the usual case. . . Typical observations sentences are about bodies:  
"This is a table," (Quine (1970), pp. 13-15).
Note that our previous quotation, from Quine's essay "On Mental Events", gives the 
opposite verdict on the near identical statement 'There is a table here!'   So it seems that 
Quine is endorsing both of the following claims: 
(A) Observation statements do not, taken singly, have their own fund of experiential 
implications
and 
(B) At least some observation statements do, taken singly, have their own fund of 
empirical experience.
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 Why does Quine give such contradictory accounts of observation statements?  And how 
does he manage to so adroitly slip from one account to another?   The answer, briefly, is 
that his extreme holism commits him to the view that observation statements have no 
special epistemological status. Yet his desire to explain the objectivity of science, and to 
avoid the incommensurability theses and relativism favored by Kuhn, Hanson and others, 
impel him to treat observation statements as having a special epistemological status.  
Quine wants observation sentences as the theory neutral arbiters of scientific theories.  
Unfortunately his general holistic framework does not allow observation sentences to 
play such a special epistemological role.  However in his causal stories concerning 
language acquisition and the aetiology of beliefs observation sentences do have a special 
role. Quine then rises to the threats of scepticism, relativism, incommensurability theses, 
et al, by switching from frankly epistemological accounts of observation statements, in 
which they are accorded no special epistemological status, to causal accounts according 
to which observation sentences have a direct causal link to sensory stimulation, and then 
implying that these close causal links are in fact epistemological links.8   All this 
confusing of epistemological links with causal links is typical of Quine's fuzzy 
eliminativism.
1.6  An Attempted Defense of Quine
     In defense of Quine it might be pointed out that the Web of Belief was written in 1970, 
whereas the extreme holism instanced above is presented mainly in Quine's early essays, 
notably his 1951 essay "Two Dogmas."  It may be claimed that the charitable thing to do 
is to infer that Quine has in the intervening years backed down from his extreme holistic 
position to a more moderate holism which allows for a special epistemological status for 
observation sentences.  Thus it might be claimed that where thesis (A) is entailed by 
Quine's extreme holism of the 50's, by the 1970's Quine had moved to a moderate holism 
which involves acceptance of (B) and hence the rejection of(A).
     Unfortunately, this position is untenable.  As recently as 1969 Quine, in his article of 
"Epistemology Naturalized," presents both his extreme holistic and his moderate holistic 
view in one and the same essay.  In "Epistemology Naturalized" Quine claims:
the typical statement about bodies has no fund of  experiential implications to call 
its own.  (Quine (1969), p. 79).
Yet a few pages later he asserts:
The observation sentence, situated at the sensory periphery of the body scientific, 
is the minimal verifiable aggregate; it has an empirical content all its own and 
wears it on its sleeve.  (loc. cit., p. 89).
     Lest anyone be bold enough to suggest that Quine here is talking of the two distinct 
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entities, namely observation sentences and typical statements about bodies, I quote again 
from "Epistemology Naturalized:"
 they [observation statements] will usually be about bodies.  (loc. cit., p. 87).
There is no way, short of putting an interpretive strain on Quine's words that they simply 
won't bear, of eliminating this contradiction.  The fact is that Quine's philosophy is
fundamentally inconsistent on the question of observation sentences.  The fact is that 
Quine is a fuzzy epistemological eliminativist.
1.7  Prospects
     Yet perhaps I have overstated the case against Quine.  Perhaps with suitable glosses 
here and charitable interpretations there Quine can be construed as a epistemological-
casual reductionist rather than a fuzzy epistemological eliminativist.  Yet interpreting 
Quine as a reductionist does not simply lead to strained readings of his various texts.  It 
also leads to somewhat embarrassing questions about the depth of Quine's work.  In 
particular, if he is a reductionist than how is it that he, unlike serious reductionists such as 
Goldman and Armstrong, never forwards specific reductive analyses of epistemological 
concepts?  
     In "Epistemology Naturalized" Quine wrote:
 Carnap and the other logical positivists of the Vienna Circle had already pressed 
the term "metaphysics" into pejorative use, as connoting meaninglessness; and the 
term  "epistemology" was next. (Quine (1969), p. 82).
In claiming that "epistemology" was next Quine is not alluding to any unpublished battle 
plans drawn up by the positivists of the Vienna circle.  Rather he is expressing his belief 
about where the logic of the positivists position would naturally lead.  That the positivists 
where on the way to rejecting epistemology should not be totally unexpected. The 
positivist Weltanshauung has no place for values, thus positivists have always been 
sympathetic to emotivist and other eliminativist accounts of moral theory.   When we 
recall that epistemology involves a normative element Quine's suggestion that 
epistemology was next on the positivists hit list seems plausible enough.  Yet the same is 
also true for neo-positivists, such as Quine himself.  The logical development of Quine's 
naturalism is to adopt a clear cut eliminativist position with respect to epistemological 
concepts.  This I believe is the logic of Quine's text, though I do not believe Quine 
himself is completely aware of this logic.  Revolutionaries often do not understand the 
full meaning of their own position.  Having been brought up under the old regime they 
are prone to inappropriate uses of the old regime's rhetoric in the very moment of 
announcing their revolutionary manifestos. Thus the revolutionary anti-epistemologist 
Quine often lapses into olde world epistemological idioms.  He equivocates between the 
options of totally rejecting the old epistemological order and that of subsuming it as a 
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sub-domain of the new causal order.
     In a certain sense, Quine, by equivocating on the status of epistemology concepts, lost 
the opportunity to throw out a clear challenge to a preconception held by nearly all 
philosophers.  That is the preconception that there is a need for a theory of justification.  
     From the naturalist point of view Quine advocates there is no need for epistemological 
explanation.  From that point of view our torrent of linguistic output is just another 
natural phenomena to be given a naturalistic, presumably naturalistic-evolutionary, 
explanation.  Perhaps in order to explain how that output contributes to our survival we 
will need to invoke the notions of content and truth. Thus we might conclude that because 
much of the content of that output is true, and because the possession of truth contributes 
to our ability to manipulate the environment in a manner that increases our survival 
prospects, evolution has favored our tendencies towards linguistic productions. 
Alternatively, we might even drop the talk of truth and speak directly of the tendency of 
our linguistic productions to cause us to modify our behavior in ways that, by and large, 
enhance our survival prospects.  In such naturalistic accounts the notion of justification 
plays no role.  None of this, of course, precludes our naturalist from giving a causal-
evolutionary account of how justificatory talk arose in our society.  By the same token he 
may be an eliminativist about moral values while giving a causal-evolutionary account of 
how moral talk arose in our society.
     
     The clear-cut epistemological eliminativist will perhaps face problems when it comes 
to defending his view.  For instance, how is he to respond to the question "What reasons, 
what justifications, are there for accepting your eliminativist view?"  At this point the 
best the eliminativist can do is give a causal account of how he came to accept his view 
while claiming that his view, like all others, is neither justified nor unjustified.  If asked 
about the justification of this last claim he will regress to a meta-meta commentary about 
how he came to make his previous claim.  There is nothing inherently vicious about this 
regress, this series of denials of justification.  However it will hardly be convincing to the 
eliminativist's opponents.  Yet this is a matter of pedagogy not truth.  When the question 
is simply one of truth the eliminativist can stick to the above line.  When the problem is 
that of convincing opponents he may practice more rhetorical arts.       
     Of course, whether a coherent world picture which eschews all positive use of 
epistemological concepts can be developed is problematic.  The claim that epistemology 
is superfluous is a bold claim.  Yet it is one whose time should have come a lot sooner.
   
     In interpreting Quine as a fuzzy epistemological eliminativist I mean to characterize 
him as a confused revolutionary reaching for but failing to fully grasp the radical position 
of clear cut epistemological eliminativism. Less flatteringly, we might interpret Quine as 
a garden variety reductionist, albeit a sloppy one who does not clearly state his position 
and fails to offer any serious attempts at reductive analyses. Interpreting Quine as a fuzzy 
eliminativist has two advantages over the Quine as reductionist interpretation. It  provides 
a more adequate fit with Quine's texts and it leaves us with a Quine of deep and abiding 
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significance.    
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2. Quine: Sic et Non
     The claim that there are tensions, if not plain inconsistencies, in Quine's 
epistemological writings has been suggested by a number of authors, including Putnam, 
Rorty, Siegel, Stroud, and, as noted above, Harding.9  In order to generally facilitate 
discussion of this important question I have attempted to gather in one place all the 
textual evidence for this claim.  Below is a series of yes-no questions which raise issues 
central to Quine's philosophy.  Each question is followed by textual excerpts from 
Quine's various works.  These excerpts suggest that Quine gives conflicting answers to 
the relevant questions. Of course it may be argued that by providing suitable glosses, 
putting the quotations in a fuller context, allowing for the occasional misstatements on 
Quine's part, etc, the threat of real conflict may be averted.  The cumbersome exercise of 
providing such glosses, etc, I leave to my more charitable readers.  The reference 
appended to each of the quotations below first cites a place where the quotation can be 
found and then, where there is a signicant diference, gives a year of first appearance.
1. Are there any statements that have meaning in themselves, that may be singly tested?
                      Sic                                                      Non
The observation sentence,                   But what I am now urging is   
situated at the sensory                         that even in taking the 
periphery of the body                         statement as unit we have    
scientific, is the minimal                    drawn our grid too finely. 
verifiable aggregate; it has                 The unit of empirical        
an empirical content all its                 significance is the whole of 
own and wears it on its                       science.                     
sleeve.                                                 (Quine (1961), p. 42. 1951).
(Quine (1969), p. 89).                   
                                           There is no separate meaning,  
 . . the observation sentence   in terms of direct experience,
itself, . . . , is peculiar on    for the statement that there  
this score.  It does face the     is a table here . . .
tribunal singly, in the usual     (Quine (1976), pp. 221-222. 
case . . . Typical observation              1955).
sentences are about bodies:                                                                       
"This is a table,"                                 Statements about bodies,
(Quine (1970), p.13-15)                     common sense or recondite,    
                                         thus commonly make little or  
 . . some statements are                       no empirical sense except as                                                                   
closely linked to observation,            bits of a collectively                                                                        
by the process of language                significant containing system.                                                                
learning.  These statements               (Quine (1976), p.254. 1955).                                                                 
18
are indeed separately                                     The typical statement about 
susceptible to tests of                                     bodies has no fund of          
observation.                                                   experiential implications to   
(Quine (1975a), p. 314).                                call its own.                 
           (Quine (1960), p.79).
2. Does the indeterminacy of translation effect observation sentences?                                                                
         
         Sic                                                                           Non
For my own part, I think the      The predicament of the        
empirical slack in physics       the indeterminacy of            
extends to ordinary traits of      translation has little bearing
ordinary bodies and hence that    on observation sentences.     
the indeterminacy of                          (Quine (1969), p. 89)         
translation likewise affects 
that level of discourse.  
(Quine (1970a), p. 181).    
3. Can there be rival translation manuals compatible with the same distributuins of 
elementary particles?
         Sic                          Non
when I say there is no fact of    Two sentences agree in                                                                               
the matter, as regards, say,  objective information, and so                                                   
two rival manuals of                    express the same proposition,                                                                                                     
translation, what I mean is   when every cosmic distribution                                                                                                                                     
that both manuals are         of particles that would make                                                                                                                                        
compatible with all the same             either sentence true would                                                                 
distributions of states and                               make the other true as well.   
relations over elementary              (Quine (1970b), p.4).         
particles  (Quine (1981), p.22).         
4. Could there be two theories both compatible with all possible observational evidence 
yet incompatible with each other in the  sense that the truth of one entails the falsity of 
the other?                                       
                    Sic                                                      Non
                                  
Physical theories can be at                              But what if, happily and                                                      
odds with each other and yet      unbeknownst, we have achieved                                                                 
compatible with all possible      a theory that is conformabe to                                                                
data even in the broadest        every possible observation,                                                                   
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sense.                                     past and future?  In what     
(Quine (1970a), p.179).                      sense could the world then be 
                                                                         said to deviate from what the 
                                            theory claims? Clearly in none.  
                                                            (Quine (1981), p.22).
5. Can and does science give us language independent traits of reality?     
    
                  Sic                                                             Non
it [science] seeks traits of                   The fundamental-seeming 
reality independent of                         philosophical
language, . . .                                      question, How much of our                               
(Quine (1976), p. 235.                        science is merely contributed 
1954).                                                  by language and how much is a 
                                                            genuine reflection of reality?
If we were to get to the                       is perhaps a spurious question                              
bottom of it [the question of               which itself arises wholly                                  
how it is that man works up                from a certain particular type                               
his command of science from             of language.  Certainly we are                               
the limited impingments that              in a predicament if we try to                                  
are available to his sensory                 answer the question; for to                                 
surfaces], we ought to be able             answer the question we must                                 
to see just to what extent                     talk about the world as well                                
science is man's free                            as about language, and to talk                              
creation; to what extent, in                  about the world we must                                     
Eddington's phrase, it is a                    already impose upon the world                               
put-up job.                                           some conceptual scheme
 (Quine (1973), pp. 3-4).       peculiar to our own language. 
We cannot strip away the        (Quine (1961), p. 78. 1950).
conceptual trappings             
sentence by sentence and leave 
a description of the objective 
world; but we can investigate 
the world, and man as a part 
of it, and thus find out what 
cues he could have of what 
goes on around him.  Subtracting his 
cues from his world view, we get
 man's net contribution as the 
 difference. (Quine (1960), p. 5). 
6. Is Quine offering genuinely epistemological accounts of justification as opposed to 
claiming that we should forgo the project of giving such accounts and merely settle for 
a causal account of how we come to our beliefs?
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    [The fourth item in the Sic column and the first item in the Non column are worth 
bearing in mind when considering the question of whether Quine believes that in 
answering skeptical doubts about the validity of science we are free to use scientific 
empirical claims in allaying those doubts.]
         Sic                           Non
I expect that tables and sheep                     The stimulation of his sensory                              
are, in the last analysis, on                          receptors is all the evidence 
much the same footing as                           anybody has to go on,         
molecules and electrons.  Even                  ultimately, in arriving at his
these have a continuing right                      picture of the world.  Why not
[emphasis mine] to a place in                     just see how this construction
our conceptual scheme only by                  really proceeds?  Why not     
virtue of their indirect                                 settle for psychology?  Such a
contribution to the overall                          surrender of the              
simplicity of our linguistic                         epistemological burden to     
or conceptual organization of                     psychology is a move that was 
experience . . .                                            disallowed in earlier times as
(Quine (1976), p. 223. 1954).                       circular reasoning.  If the   
                                                                      epistemologist's goal is      
  . . . the testimony of the                              validation of the grounds of  
senses does (contrary to                               empirical science, he defeats 
Berkeley's notion) count as                          his purpose by using          
evidence for bodies . . .                   psychology or other empirical                                         
(Quine (1976), p. 251. 1955).                      science in the validation.    
                                                                     However, such scruples against
A sufficient reason for his                circularity have little point 
[the physicist's] positing                              once we have stopped dreaming 
extraordinary physical things,                     of deducing science from      
viz. molecules, is that for                            observations.  If we are out  
the thus-supplemented universe                   simply to understand the link 
he can devise a theory 0'                               between observation and       
which is simpler than 0 and                         science, we are well advised  
agrees with 0 in its                                        to use any available          
consequences for ordinary                           information, including that   
things.                                                           provided by the very science  
(Quine (1960), p. 21).                                  whose link with observation we
                                                 are trying to understand.         
A far cry, this, from the old           (Quine (1969), pp. 75-76).    
epistemology.  Yet it is no 
gratuitous change of subject                       The dilemma [of what to count 
matter, but an enlightened             as data] is dissolved, and the
persistence rather in the                 strain relieved, when we give 
original epistemological                up the dream of a first       
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problem.  It is enlightened            philosophy firmer than        
in recognizing that the                  science.  If we are seeking   
sceptical challenge springs              only the causal mechanism     
from science itself, and in              [emphasis mine] of our        
coping with it we are free to             knowledge of the external     
use scientific knowledge.  The          world, and not a justification
old epistemologist failed to            of that knowledge in terms    
recognize the strength of his           prior to science, we can      
position.                                 settle for a theory of vision 
(Quine (1973), p. 3).                   in Berkeley's style.          
                                                 (Quine (1970c), p.2).         
our initially uncritical            For we can fully grant the                                                                                                             
hypothesis of a physical world           truth of natural science and    
gains pragmatic support from           still raise the question,                                                                         
whatever it contributes                              within natural science, how is                                                                    
towards a coherent account of                   it that man works up his                                                                      
lorebearing or other natural                       command of that science                                                                           
phenomena.                                                from the limited impingments                                                                      
(Quine, (1976), p. 230.                    that are available to his                                                                         
1954).                                  sensory surfaces.  This is a                                                                      
                                          question of empirical psych-                                        
Having noted that man has no             ology, . . (Quine (1973), p.3).                               
evidence for the existence of             
 bodies beyond the fact that Mostly in this book I have  speculated on 
 their assumption helps him causes, not justifications. . . Even in  
organize experience, we should                      the case of bodies, . . . , I  
have done well, instead of                               offered no hope of             
disclaiming evidence for the                            justification.  I entertained  
existence of bodies,                                         no thought of translating talk 
conclude: such then, at                                    of bodies into talk of sense   
bottom, is what evidence is,                            impressions, . . . I asked     
both for ordinary bodies and                           how, given our stimulations,  
for molecules.             we might have developed our   
(Quine, (1976), p. 251. 1955)                          corporeal style of  talk. . .   
.                                                                        One could ask, in the same     
                                                                         spirit, how we developed our   
                                                                         religious talk, our talk  of   
                                                                         witchcraft, . . . If we        
                                                                          managed to reconstruct these   
                                                                         causal chains of language      
                                                                          learning, we would find that   
   every here and there the                                            
learner had made a little leap 
the strength of analogy or                                                                             
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confusion; but then the        
                         same seemed to be true of our  
                                                                         learning to talk of bodies. In 
                                                                         short, I speculated on causes  
 and not on values.                                                                                                                 
(Quine (1973), pp. 136-137).   
                               Epistemology, for me, or what 
                                  comes closest to it, is the   
                                study of how we animals can   
                                         have contrived that very      
                                  science, given just that      
                                   sketchy neural input.                
                                  (Quine, (1981), p.21).        
7. Can two different though empirically equivalent theories be construed as being true of 
the same world?                   
                 Sic                          Non
Both (of two empirically          May there not be some         
equivalent theory                radically alternative         
formulations that we see no     conceptual structure, undreamt
way of reconciling by              of, that would fit all the past   
reinterpretation of                 observations and all the      
predicates] can be admitted      predicted ones equally well   
thenceforward as true              [as our own conceptual        
descriptions of one and the       structure), and yet be       
same world in different terms.     untranslatable into our 
The threat of relativism of         scheme? Our own physical      
truth is averted.                  theory and that one would be  
(Quine (1981), p. 30).           two world versions, equally   
                                 sound.  Two versions of the   
                                  world [emphasis Quine's]?  But
                                             what world is that?  To       
                                   describe it we must retreat   
                                               into one version or the other;
                                  they share no neutral         
                                  description.  Recognize the   
                                   two versions, Goodman says,   
  and    leave it at that. This much will  
already estrange many of Goodman's                               
readers. Not me (Quine (1981), p.97. 
1978).
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8. Is the posit of physical objects a myth from the epistemological point of view?
         Sic                                                            Non
Viewed from within the                            To call a posit a posit is not
phenomenalistic conceptual                      to patronize it. . . . Nor let                              
scheme, the ontologies of                          us look down on the        
physical objects and                                  standpoint of the theory as   
mathematical objects are                          make-believe; for we can never
myths.  The quality of myth,                    do better than to occupy the  
however, is relative;                                 standpoint of some theory or  
relative, in this case, to the                       other, the best we can muster 
epistemological point of view.                 at the time.                  
(Quine (1961), p.19. 1948).                     (Quine (1960), p. 22).        
Physical objects, small and                         We cannot properly represent  
large, are not the only                                  man as inventing a myth of    
posits.  Forces are another                           physical objects to fit past  
example . . .                                                 and present sense data.       
Epistemologically these are                         (Quine (1976), p. 251. 1955).
myths on the same footing with 
physical objects and gods, 
neither better nor worse 
except in the degree they 
help expedite our dealings 
with sensory experiences . .  
Total science, mathematical 
and natural and human, is 
similarly but more extremely
 underdetermined by experience. 
 The edge of the system must be 
kept squared with experience; 
the rest, with all its 
elaborate myths or fictions, 
has as its objective the 
simplicity of laws.  
(Quine (1961), p. 45, emphasis 
mine. 1951).
9.  Is science value free?
         Sic                                                                Non
Scientific theory stands                        Our speculations about the    
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proudly and notoriously aloof               world remain subject to norms 
from value judgments.                          and caveats, but these issue  
(Quine (1973), p. 49                             from science itself as we acquire it.                   
                                                              (Quine (1981), p. 181).10       
25
References
Armstrong, D. M., Belief, Truth and Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1973).
Harding, S., Making Sense of Observation Sentences," Ratio 17      (1975), 65-71.
Putnam, H., Realism and Reason, Philosophical Papers, volume 3  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983).
Quine, W. V. O., Word & Object (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1960).
______, From A Logical Point Of View (New York: Harper and Row, 1961).
______, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York:      Columbia University 
Press, 1969).
______ and Ullian, J. S., The Web of Belief (New York: Random      House, 1970).
______, "On the Reasons for the Indeterminacy of Translation,"     The Journal of 
Philosophy 67 (1970a), 178-183.
______, Philosophy of Logic (Englewood Cliff, N.J.: Prentice-     Hall, 1970b).
______, "Grades of Theoreticity," in Swanson and Foster (eds.),   Experience and Theory  
(London: Duckworth, 1970c). 
______, The Roots of Reference (La Salle: Open Court, 1973).
______, "The Nature of Natural Knowledge," in S. Guttenplan (ed.), Mind and Language
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975).
______, "On Empirically Equivalent Systems of the World," Erkenntnis 9 (1975a), 313-
328.
______, The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays, 2nd ed. (Cambridge:      Harvard 
University Press, 1976).
______, "Facts of the Matter," in W. Shahan and C. Swoyer (eds.),      Essays on the 
Philosophy of W. V. Quine (Norman: University      of Oklahoma Press, 1979).
______, Theories and Things (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,      1981). 
Rorty, R., Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980).
26
Siegel, H., "Justification, Discovery and the Naturalizing of Epistemology," Philosophy 
of Science 47 (1980), 297-321.
Stove, D., Popper and After: Four Modern Irrationalists (Oxford: Permagon Press, 
1982).




* A version of this paper was first delivered at the Sydney University Philosophy 
Colloquium in May 1983.
1 "The Scope and Language of Science" and "Posits and Reality” appear in Quine (1976). 
"On what there is" and "Two dogmas of empiricism" appear in Quine (1961). 
"Ontological Relativity” and "Epistemology Naturalized" appear in Quine (1969). 
2 For textual evidence of Quine's anti-Cartesianism Cf.  Quine (1975), p.68 and Quine 
(1969), pp.74-76.
3 For textual evidence of this pragmatic element in Quine Cf. Quine (1976), pp. 223 and 
230, Quine (1961), p.46.
4 For textual evidence of Quine's holism Cf. Quine (1961), pp.  40 and 42.
5 Cf., for instance, chapters 11 and 12 of Armstrong (1973).
6 Stove reiterates this point in his Stove (1982). 
7 We should perhaps pause here to note that in "Two Dogmas" Quine   does claim that 
some statements do have close links with   experience.  Thus in "Two Dogmas" Quine 
tells us:
     Certain statements, though about physical objects and not sense experience, seem 
peculiarly germane to sense experience - and in a selective way: some statements to some 
experiences, others to others....  But in this relation of "germaneness" I envisage nothing 
more than a loose associating reflecting the relative likelihood, in practice, of our 
choosing one statement rather than an another for revision in the event of recalcitrant 
experience.  (Quine (1961), p. 43).
  It seems Quine is here making a practical point about the causal proximity of certain 
sentences to sense experience, and using this to explain why certain statements seem
particularly   relevant to particular experiences.  This practical point does   not touch on 
the epistemological claim that from an   epistemological point of view no statement, 
singly, enjoys any   direct link with experience.
8 Similar points are tellingly made in Harding (1975). 
9 Cf. Putnam (1983), esp. pp.240-245; Rorty (1980), esp. pp.221-  230;  Siegel 
(1980)esp. pp.317-320; Stroud (1984), esp. pp.208-  254;  and Harding (1975).
10 This paper has benefited from comments from Michael McDermott, Mark Lance and 
Irad Kimhi, and especially from comments from and discussions with Rob Shaver.  A 
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special thanks is due to Michael Devitt who first introduced me to the works of Quine.
